On Measuring Development Success

Amanda comments on the difficulty of defining "good work". I think we are basically hitting on the problem of measurement. This is a problem raised in many industries such (e.g. health care) where there are multiple parallel goals (e.g. health care has cost reductions, patient survival, patient satisfaction, long term health outcomes, to name just a few that need to be accounted). The argument runs that in all these industries, boiling down measuring results is much more difficult than in business.

I personally think this is a false argument, at least to some extent. Business success isn't as easily measured as looking at the profit line. Any Board of Directors that's any good looks at profits, but also at asset position (balance sheets), future growth prospects, human resources talent, etc. and makes a somewhat subjective decision on a manager's success and their deserving compensation. Deciding between the value of short term profits versus the value of long term investment in future growth comes down to a subjective "guess" educated somewhat by historical data. It's not much different than balancing present health care cost reductions versus future health outcomes, or development funds raised versus future economic growth. If anything, I think the moral nature of these endeavours makes it easier to decide what the ultimate priority is (i.e. future heath outcomes; future economic growth). Where I think we do run into trouble is lacking historical data to guide our valuations of various endpoints. Without this data, I think our guesses become more uneducated.

I don't think that the difficulty of measuring "good work" should necessarily be a barrier to making development an industry; we just need to do some research to figure out the ballpark for reasonable valuations of various success rates. If we get past this point, I think Amanda's core issue (glancingly addressed, hinted, but never quite stated) is simple, but powerful: will it work?

If we knew that making development a business would work, and work better than the status quo, I think the case against it would be very difficult. Similarly, if we knew that it would lead to worse outcomes, I doubt that anyone would advocate for it. Sadly, answering this question scientifically is difficult: we need to compare two very similar situations in which each endeavour has been tried and then compare the results. In the absence of scientific data, we are left to make arguments based on reasoning. With a complex system that no one fully understands, or probably even understand well, none of us can have much confidence in reasoning.

Nonetheless, I'm going to engage in a bit of reasoning.

Development as Local Industry

At a fundamental level, I think that everyone agrees that development needs to be about self-sufficiency. If an underdeveloped country never becomes self-sufficient and is always dependent on outside help to remain afloat, then it hasn't reached a point of being "developed".

Necessary in any conception of self-sufficiency is that people (in the developing world) can earn at least a living doing the work. And if we assume some level of freedom and private enterprise, innovation is going to be contingent on the ability of people to earn a profit should their investments in innovation pan out. More simply, further development will be contingent on the ability of the indigent to earn a profit. Otherwise, no one but rich philanthropers will invest in potential innovations: where is the incentive?

This is an argument about locals and not expats. However, in this narrow case, the logical endpoint is that we need development work to result in an industry (or more precisely, many industries) for the locals so that continued development will occur.

So Should External Intervention be a Business

If we accept then that external involvement in development needs to result in a local industry as its endpoint, the question with which we are left is how should external involvement build this local industry. This is a much more difficult question to answer.

In some cases, we know the answer. When it comes to economic development, I think we agree that foreign investors should be investing in the businesses that have good business plans and the chance to be successes; investing in failures will result in everyone who has a state in that business (including the population of the communities that need that economic growth), losing. Therefore in the case where we are creating nascent industries (e.g. much of Engineers Without Borders's work), a profit motive and a business mindset is essential.

The answer becomes more difficult when it is not clear that we want to have a stake in the outcome. E.g. when setting up schools and training teachers so that children can get a primary education, having a stake in the outcome feels immoral. Do we want to be claiming a share in future teachers' salaries when those teachers likely won't have a very high standard of living? Do we want to own the schools we build so that we can earn a profit from the local government's educational funding we receive when that money could instead be used by the local governments for other activities? The way around these situations is often to get the developing world to do take the stakes instead: get the government or universities to have a stake in teacher education, and locals to have a stake in school construction and operations. But that's not always possible: if that could happen so easily, the developed world wouldn't need to be involved in development. And even when it is possible to give the locals a stake in the endeavour, the developed world is intervening to encourage this model and we've ducked the question of whether the external interveners should be rewarded for their performance in accomplishing this.

And that's really the third case which is completely murky: where the work done isn't nearly connected to any sort of earnings—which is really the kind of work the developed world needs to help out with. E.g. promoting women's rights or building democratic institutions do not lend themselves to external partners having any real stake in the results, nor are they work tied in any way to any sort of profit: they are purely philanthropic acts. I think this group forms one of the two groups for whom we need to debate this question. The second group, as Amanda noted, are executives.

A reasonable starting point for these would probably be to look at what competitive pricing for staff would attract: would we get similarly-able development workers, or would there be actual improvements? As well, if we pay more for development workers, what are reasonable estimates of what we'd gain (by better workers) and lose (by spending more on staff and less on non-staff expenses, or fewer staff).

I think it is hard to go any further in this debate without having answers to these questions which probably means that these questions are punted over to development organizations that have to make staff decisions. And of course, underlying all this remains the original question: will it actually work?

Ignatieff's positions on the issues are vague platitudes. Without an agenda or mandate endorsed (albeit indirectly) by the party membership, Ignatieff has extraordinary leeway to do as he pleases.

And by not engaging the membership through delegates to choose a new leader, will Ignatieff have the same stature as a normal party leader? Will Harper use this circumvention of the normal quasi-democratic process as a cudgel with which to hit the Liberals for their anti-democratic ways ("first they block Senate reform to keep their appointed cronies in power, then they try to subvert an election with a coalition, now they won't even allow the membership to choose their new leader").

The Liberal Party could have appointed a caretaker leader (e.g. Ralph Goodale who has credibility on the economy) and gone ahead with their normal selection process. Instead they have taken the gamble of circumventing that process (so soon after the coalition gamble seemed to fail).

I'm not sure where the Liberal Party is heading, and it might not make them a stronger party. I don't know if a weak Liberal Party is what Canada needs right now.

Robert Gates:

I've just reassured myself of this, and he assured me that in fact that his statements, prior to him taking this office, in which he advocated the ouster of Saddam Hussein still stand. Now, keep in mind that the secretary believed that the ouster of Saddam Hussein -- that the goal here was not to necessarily -- liberating Iraq was a by-product of the goal. The secretary believed that Saddam Hussein was a destabilizing influence in the region who was intent, if he didn't them already, on developing weapons of mass destruction. He was convinced, the secretary was, that the sanctions were crumbling and that it was only a matter of time before -- if he didn't have them already, he would develop a weapons of mass destruction program. In light of that, he believed and still does believe that the right course of action was to topple Saddam Hussein.
- Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell, September 20, 2007

John Kerry:

"I think we clearly have to keep the pressure on terrorism globally. This doesn't end with Afghanistan by any imagination. And I think the president has made that clear. I think we have made that clear. Terrorism is a global menace. It's a scourge. And it is absolutely vital that we continue against, for instance, Saddam Hussein."
- John Kerry, December 14, 2001

"I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security."
- John Kerry, October 9, 2002

"Without question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator; leading an oppressive regime he presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation. So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real."
- John Kerry, January 23, 2003

John Kerry also voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq.

Christopher Dodd:

Christopher Dodd voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq.

Bill Richardson:

Bill Richardson apparently supported Bush's decision to go to war.

Richard Holbrooke:

"Iraq will be one of the major issues facing the incoming Bush administration at the United Nations."

…

"Saddam Hussein's activities continue to be unacceptable and, in my view, dangerous to the region and, indeed, to the world, not only because he possesses the potential for weapons of mass destruction but because of the very nature of his regime. His willingness to be cruel internally is not unique in the world, but the combination of that and his willingness to export his problems makes him a clear and present danger at all times."
- Richard Holbrook, January 11, 2001

"On the issue of American objectives, this administration has (rightly) called for regime change. Unfortunately, few other nations in the world, and especially in the region, will openly subscribe to such a goal. Other nations will probably seek to limit any resolution to the issue of weapons of mass destruction. This, however, is less of a problem than it initially appears. If military action begins, it will soon become evident that it is impossible to eliminate the weapons without a change in regime."

"Given that the Iraqi military is only one-third the size it was before the Gulf war, and American forces far stronger, the odds favour an American success. But no one can foresee clearly what will occur once a war starts. Will there be an assassination, a rebellion, a crumbling of the Iraqi military, a quick victory that pre-empts Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, a protracted struggle, or something worse? Whatever happens, once launched, the effort against Saddam cannot be stopped until its goal is achieved and the overwhelming power of the US has prevailed."
- Richard Holbrooke, August 29, 2002

Joe Biden:

Joe Biden voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq.

It appears that Obama's likely foreign policy team was universally in favour of the Iraq War to some degree. I'm not sure what exactly this indicates about Obama. Certainly there's been some in consistency in his position over the past two years.

Press Release:

"Prime Minister Stephen Harper speaks to Canadian troops during visit to Afghanistan"
May 23, 2007
(Stephen Harper)
Khandahar, Afghanistan

You know that we cannot just put down our arms and hope for peace. You know that we can't set arbitrary deadlines and simply wish for the best. And you must also know that your hard work is making a real difference to real people and their families.

Consider a letter recently sent from a young girl in Canada to your comrades with the Royal Canada Dragoons patrolling the Pakistan border about 100 kilometres southeast of here. Decorated with coloured hearts, this letter from a youngster born in Kabul tells the story of a family who fled to Pakistan after being chased from this country by the Taliban. She writes:

"My mom wanted a country that was safe and where I would be able to learn so we came to Canada. Thank you so much for staying to make my country a better place and tell your soldier friends that I said thank you."

Friends, you are helping the Afghan people make a better life for themselves and their children."

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Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (John Manley, Derek Burney, Jake Epp, Paul Tellier, Pamela Wallin) January 15, 2008 p. 32–33 (original source)

"The Canadian combat mission should conclude when the Afghan National Army is ready to provide security in Kandahar province. Progress to that end will accelerate as training of the ANA intensifies; and without doubt, more military resources from other ISAF countries must be forthcoming. Ending Canada’s military contribution in Kandahar is therefore not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground.

. . .

"Canadian interests and values, and Canadian lives, are now invested in Afghanistan. The sacrifices made there, by Canadians and their families, must be respected. What we do there (or stop doing) affects the Afghan people. It can affect Canadian security. It can affect Canada’s reputation in the world. It can affect our influence in international affairs, particularly with respect to future international responses to the dangers and deprivations of failed and fragile states. Canada is a wealthy G8 country; our good fortune and standing impose on us both authority and obligations in global affairs.

. . .

"A premature military withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether full or partial, would imperil Canadian interests and values. It would diminish the effectiveness of Canadian aid in Afghanistan, by further constraining the ability of Canadian aid workers to move among Afghans. It could encourage insurgents. It could weaken the confidence of some Afghans living in Kandahar in their own future and in their own government, increasing their susceptibility to the Taliban insurgency. It would undermine Canada’s influence in the UN and in NATO capitals, including Washington. It could curtail Canada’s capacity (and raise questions abroad about our future willingness) to act, and persuade others to act, in enforcing peace and restoring security where peace and security are threatened. In sum, an immediate military withdrawal from Afghanistan would cause more harm than good. Even an ill-prepared partial withdrawal would risk undercutting international confidence in Canadian commitments and impose new burdens on others obliged to take our place in Kandahar."

Read to Take Over?

Abboud begins his post by noting the constitutional responsibilities of the Vice-President are to assume the Presidency if the President is unable to perform the duties of the office, and to cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate. He also highlights the following quote by McCain earlier this year:

The fundamental principle behind any selection of a running mate would be whether that person is fully prepared to take over, and shares your values, your principles, your philosophy and your priorities,” he said. “I think that’s the first and only real criteria for the selection of a running mate.

I agree with Abboud that these are the correct markers by which to asses her suitability to be President.

Record

The first of Abboud's arguments centres around Governor Palin's supposed lack of experience:

she has the thinnest resume of anyone to appear on a major presidential ticket since Jimmy Carter

This argument begs the question of what is the necessary experience to be President. To benchmark, Palin has been in politics since 1992, having served 4 years on a town council, 6 years as mayor, 1 year on a state regulatory commission, and 2 years as Governor. To find the magic line where one has adequate experience, compare, let us consider others who were considered for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency this election cycle.

• Barack Obama has been in politics since 1996, serving 8 years in the state senate, and then 2 years in the federal senate before embarking on his presidential campaign (he now has 4 years in the Senate).
• Hillary Clinton had served in elected politics for 6 years before running for President (she's served close to 8 now).
• Kathleen Sebelius was a serious choice for Vice-President having served 8 years in a state legislature, 8 years as state insurance commissioner, and 6 years as Governor.
• Mark Warner was considered a credible candidate for President and for Vice-President (before saying he did not want to be considered) and has served only 4 years as governor.
• Mitt Romney was considered a credible choice for President and for Vice-President and has served only 4 years as governor.
• Tim Kaine was considered a credible choice for Vice-President despite having served only 3 years as governor and 4 years as Mayor before that (a very similar resume to Governor Palin).

In terms of quantity of government service, Governor Palin falls in the middle of this pack, and ahead of Obama.

But perhaps we should consider quality? Fine, let us consider executive experience. Palin has 9 years of executive experience. Obama and Clinton have none. Sebelius has 14 years. Kaine has 7 years. And Warner and Romney a mere 4 years. Even John McCain has none. If we're looking at years of executive experience, Palin is in the middle of the pack again, and better than any of the other national ticket candidates, Obama, McCain, or Biden.

You could split hairs and argue that Warner and Romney have executive experience outside of government, but then Palin runs a commercial fishing business too. Or you could argue that being Governor is most similar to being President, but in that case, Palin's 2 years isn't much less than Kaine's 3 years, or Romey's and Warner's 4 years, and it's still more than Clinton, Obama, McCain, or Biden.

Maybe we should argue as David Frum does that fancy titles and positions don't matter, but achievements are what shows real experience:

Can we conservatives please stop kidding ourselves about Barack Obama's "qualifications"? Yes, if I had been a Democratic donor back in 2006, I'd sure worry about whether Barack Obama had what it took to be president. That was before he took on the toughest political operation in America, before he beat Bill and Hillary Clinton, before he won 18 million primary votes.

Obama's nomination was not handed to him. He fought hard for it and won against the odds. "Qualifications" predict achievement. Once you have achieved, it doesn't matter what your qualifications are. Who cares whether the guy who built a big company from nothing didn't have much of a resume when he started? But if you are applying to run a big company built by somebody else, the resume matters ...

Ok, fine. Palin has challenged entrenched and powerful superiors (her mentor on town council, the incumbent mayor, the state party chairman, the attorney-general, the incumbent governor of her own party) and every time has succeeded from a position of political weakness but ethical high ground. As mayor, she successfully cut taxes and managed to be elected the president of the Alaska Conference of Mayors. As Governor, she's paved the way for new pipeline development, introduced new laws on ethics, and forced oil companies to accept new taxes. The other politicians I have listed above all have their share of achievements as well. I could list everyone's achievements, but to my impression, Palin's achievements in her short time in office are not out of line with the other candidates.

One can argue that Palin has governed smaller populations and find other qualifications to discount her experience. But all this is splitting hairs many times over. The simple fact is that in terms of quantity, quality, or achievements, Palin has a resume that's not out of line of what the other candidates who are widely accepted as credible Presidents have. At worst, she isn't far off someone like Tim Kaine.

Foreign Policy Experience

This brings us to the second part of Abboud's argument: that Palin lacks foreign policy experience. This is true. She has never conducted any significant amount of foreign policy. But then John McCain has never conducted foreign policy either and he's seen as a strong leader on national security issues. Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Mark Warner, Mitt Romney, Kathleen Sebelius, Tim Kaine—none of them has conducted foreign policy. It's difficult to hold this against Palin, considering.

What Abboud probably wants to point out is that we have no evidence that she knows much about foreign policy. As he writes,

With most politicians who lack conventional experience, we at least have a record of them giving serious thought and having serious conversations with serious people about the issues of the day.

Sure. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Just because she hasn't spoken in detail about these (largely because it hasn't been part of her job to comment on them), it does not mean she doesn't have understanding and competence in the issues. She may not have dealt with them as much as a Biden or a McCain who've served on major foreign affairs committees, but neither had Romney, Huckabee, Bayh, Warner, or Kaine. Once they became national candidates, we learnt their positions (and in the case of Bayh, Warner, and Kaine, we still don't know—they only spoke of Obama's or Clinton's positions; never their own). I don't think we can hold Palin at fault for not having said much about foreign policy to date. Certainly, we can't assume anything about her competence on the issues. The only people who are likely to know are McCain and his vice-presidential nominee selection team. Until we have more information, we have to assume the knew what they were doing.

In summary, on the questions of political experience and foreign policy knowledge, Palin does not seem significantly worse, if at all worse, than others who've been considered for Vice-Presdent or President. While we certainly can't be sure she'd make a competent President or a good Commander-in-Chief, we really can't do much more for Obama, Biden, or McCain. If anything, she has a record of running governments successfully while Obama and Biden have no executive experience at all, and McCain's only executive experience is commanding a training and maintenance air squadron of the Navy over three decades ago which isn't clearly transferable experience. I don't think Palin's fitness to run the federal government is obviously worse than the other three national ticket candidates.

What Does the VP Pick Show About the Candidate?

Abboud argues that McCain's pick is a political choice rather than one that's appropriate for the role of the Vice-President. Instead of choosing Palin, Abboud argues

McCain could have made a daring choice. He could have defied his base and chose a pro-choice VP with national security credentials - former homeland security director Tom Ridge or Connecticut Senator Joe Liebermann, both of whom were rumoured to be on the short list.

I'm not sure what "a daring choice" has to do with Abboud's two stated criteria for a Vice-President selection: competence to assume the Presidency, and sharing the values, principles, philosophy, and priorities of the Presidential candidate. As a pro-life Senator, choosing a pro-choice candidate would run against the values, principles, philosophy, and priorities of McCain. As well, Ridge has never shown much drive to fight wasteful spending or reform government which is core to McCain's philosophy and central amongst his priorities. While Liebermann is with McCain on the most central issues, he's on the wrong side of McCain on almost everything else (hence being a Democrat). Not terribly good fits with McCain's values, principles, philosophy, and priorities.

Abboud continues

If he didn’t want to focus all on national security, he could have gone for a mold-breaker in another direction. Meg Whitman and Carly Fiorina, both highly successful businesswomen and McCain supporters, would have been groundbreaking in two ways. First, they would have been the first women on a GoP ticket, and second overall behind ‘84 Democratic running mate Geraldine Ferraro. Second, as career businesswomen, either one would have been the first non-politician on a major party ticket in over 50 years, President Eisenhower being the last.

Once again, the obsession with "mould-breakers" and "groundbreaking". Not the criteria laid out by Abboud earlier. Going for a candidate because they are a woman would be putting politics over good governance which is exactly what Abboud is opposing in this post.

He continues

McCain could have had a qualified, ground-breaking running mate. He could have bucked the party trend, showing real leadership and a real maverick streak.

Instead, Palin got picked because he wants someone who shares his values, principles, philosophy and priorities. In crass terms, he wants a mini-me. She got picked because she satisfies the neo-cons, and she can play well on the campaign trail, not because she can help govern.

The first part of that second paragraph is exactly right: McCain wanted someone who shared his values, principles, philosophy and priorities. McCain wanted someone who would continue something very similar to the McCain agenda were he unable to finish his presidency. That seems to me to be responsible succession: making sure that the policies and agenda the people vote for will continue.

The second part of the paragraph about satisfying the party base and helping campaign, etc. may well have been considerations as well. But the key it seems to me is that, as Abboud puts it, Palin is McCain's "mini-me". She's the one who'll continue his agenda.

Let me finish by briefly comparing this to Obama's selection of Biden.

The Obama campaign was premised on two principles:

1. That Washington needed change, and electing the same old Washington insiders like Hillary Clinton or John McCain won't change Washington. Real change, change one could believe in, had to come from outside Washington. And Obama was the relative outsider who could change how business is conducted in Washington.
2. Judgement matters more than experience when it comes to foreign policy. In particular, Obama had the judgement to know that the Iraq War was a mistake from the start, while the experienced hands like Clinton, Edwards, and McCain all got it wrong.

In choosing Biden, Obama chose someone who is a longer term Washington insider (36 years) than any of Clinton (16 years), McCain (26 years), or Edwards (6 years). As well he chose someone who did not have the foreign policy judgement to oppose the Iraq War.

Certainly Biden has some strong qualities: he will help complement Obama's perceived weakness on foreign affairs, he will attract blue collar workers that Obama has trouble attracting, and he will give Obama a strong campaigner and debater. But should Obama be unable to complete his presidency, he will leave the country with a President who's a Washington insider and has been part of the system that Obama claims doesn't work, and Obama will leave the country with a Commander-in-Chief that didn't have the judgement to oppose the Iraq War. That kind of succession planning won't leave the voters with what they voted for.

-----

SPECIAL EVENT PARKING IN EFFECT, flashed the road sign. It became readily apparent that this wouldn't be a typical tourist stop. So, I parked at Texas State University's Bobcat Stadium, and waited for a shuttle to ferry me the 2 miles to the rally.

As the bus snaked around the row of State Trooper cars, I saw the massive queue of students. Obama's website recommended arriving 90 minutes before the rally, which I treated as a bit of a joke. I'm not twiddling my thumbs for an hour and a half just to listen to some political hack. That said, I was still 45 minutes “early”, and there were thousands of people in the queue, snaked around 3 city blocks near Sewell Park, the site of the rally.

The bus let us off. Trouble is, this was still in mid-queue, so our bus-load gang walked to the end of the line.

And walked. And walked. And walked. We must have walked for nearly a kilometre, until we reached the “end” of the line. Funny thing is, we were closer to Sewell Park than many of the folks in the front of the line, as the line was curling back towards the park.

This was a little ridiculous, I thought. Apparently, so did an Obama volunteer, who promptly told us that there was “another entrance” just behind us. As a result, a throng of us sprinted toward this new entrance in this mass mob. It had the peace and tranquility of a metropolitan subway system.

But no matter. We were in a new queue, within visible distance to the makeshift park “entrance”. Of course, it begs the question, it's a bloody public park -- why do so many people have to stand in line?

Soon enough, the answer became apparent. There was only one formal entrance to the park, as that was where the metal detectors were located. They had a full airport-style security checkpoint set up in the area. It was actually pretty clever – Sewell Park borders both sides of a small river valley. They fenced off the entire park around the main stage on the west, and they set up the checkpoint on the other side of the river, in front of the only bridge. So, we waited.

--------

Then, all of a sudden, the entire gang started running for the checkpoint. What the hell? Pandemonium ensued. People started jumping over barriers, towards the bridge, while I just got caught in the wave, heading for the checkpoint. It was absolute madness. I suppose that this is how people get trampled near Mecca.

As we lemmings approached the bridge, it was evident why the surge of people moved. They closed the damn checkpoint! I guess that they had filled up the near side of the river, which was nearly 5,000 people. So, the rest of the mob was forced to camp on the far side.

------

No worries. We all were able to at least find a place to stand, or a treetop to climb. All 15,000 of us.

The row of speeches began with the head of the Texas State U`s Young Democrats. He was promptly booed, derided with chants of “We Want Obama!” Next up was LBJ's grandson, who was also booed at first, until the crowd got some sense of decorum into them.

Then, The Man came on-stage. The crowd was transfixed. They must have cheered for nearly 5 minutes, while Obama composed himself.

And delivered a hell of a speech. It's funny, I'd never seen Obama give a speech in public, not even on TV. Sure, I'd seen a few newsclips and watched him stammer in debates, and I had heard that he was an outstanding speaker. But he really mesmerized the crowd. It may not be like how he affects Chris Matthews, but he's a phenomenal speaker all the same.

“I'm convinced that in America, people want politics that isn't about tearing each other down, but about lifting people up.”

It can be said that Obama has been given a bit of a free ride in the mainstream media. The Saturday Night Live skits are certainly one indication of this. But he is a bit of a blank slate. For the moment, Barack Obama is the candidate of aspiration – he doesn't represent who America is, but who America can be. It's analogous to the Starbucks effect – most of us don't drink Starbucks because of the taste of the coffee. We drink Starbucks because (a) it's the trendy thing to do, and (b) it creates an aspirational self-image of who they wish to be.

“Every child is our child. Every child is our responsibility. Every child is the responsibility... of America.”

All of a sudden, a shrill cry is heard in the crowd: “I love you, Obama!”

Obama stops. I'm sure that he's heard that before. He smiles, then announces, “I love you, too.”

“We cannot afford to wait. We can’t wait to fix our schools, we can’t wait to fix our health care system, to bring an end to global warming, to bring good jobs at good wages. We cannot wait to bring an end to this war.”

Based on rhetoric alone, Barack Obama is a fine candidate for president. But what does he stand for? Moreover, can he ever get that over the “experience” argument? I have no idea. But I do know that if the mob of 15,000 in San Marcos is any indication, he certainly has the ability to transform the American people.

“If you want change, it's Hillary who has always been a world-class change-maker!” Clinton thundered as he addressed the crowd of several hundred. “I encourage you all to vote not once, but twice for Hillary this election!” (This is due to the “Texas two-step” process in the Democratic primary/caucus. )

Turnout was modest, though this was Clinton's 5th rally of the day, to be climaxed with a massive speech on the UTexas campus, later that evening. The crowd was primarily students, mainly female, with the median age approximately 20.

Yes, that's some Ron Paul yahoo with his sign.

The crowd response was good, but many students were still undecided after the stump speech. I talked with Betty L, an Education student at the college. She said that she was impressed with Hillary's experience in health care and education. Still, she will “probably decide at the last minute”, as she had been originally leaning towards Obama.

The overall impression? Bill gave a fine speech. He didn't shout, or sound angry, but was simply a passionate supporter of Hillary. That said, much of what Clinton said was stuff that we already knew, and it seemed that it would be a challenge to convince the undecideds one way or another. Even so, it was a good effort during the final push of the campaign.

What always bugs me about these rants is that Garth Turner tries to portray himself as clairvoyant enough to see all of these problems coming, and as someone staunchly opposed to them. Yet, (a) he never seems to have tried to raise alarm over them, even after he was booted from caucus, (b) he seems to raise these complaints only when everything has become public (e.g. his recent comments on committee members' independence), and (c) that Turner characterizes these episodes as massive affronts to democracy, ones that he thinks are unpalatable, yet he never did the logical thing in that situation: to resign from caucus in protest.

While many of Turner's criticisms are probably correct, I can't help but get the feeling that he was nowhere near as clairvoyant has he now claims that he was, and while on some issues (e.g. caucus secrecy) he would not cooperate with the party leadership, he was on most other issues a party lemming and is only now jumping on the bandwagon whenever someone else shows the bad side of the Harper government. As well, I find it more than a little inconsistent for him to blame Tory MPs for heeling to the supposed Harper autocracy when there seems to have been few instances where he did otherwise. Even on policies that he now raises a fuss over (e.g. income trust taxation, child care grants, the war in Afghanistan, the 2006 budget), Turner publically defended those decisions at the time and voted in favour of them.

Turner's accusations would be much more credible if he stopped trying to characterize himself as the flawless champion of the good in the Tory caucus, and instead acknowledged that he was party to many of these anti-democratic initiatives, but that he now sees that was taking Parliament in the wrong direction.

That brings us to the next crucial point: the cost of emissions abatement isn't necessarily the same for all polluters. Consider two coal-fired power plants, one of which is sixty years old and would need to be retrofitted with scrubbers requiring a shutdown and substantial redesign, and the other which is in the construction phase and has scrubbers planned: clearly, the cost of abating CO2 emissions from the first plant will be higher than that from the second. I'm sure you can find other illustrations (e.g. hybrid cars versus Hummers). In fact, it's exceedingly unlikely that everyone will have the same cost to abate!

Now, why's this an important point? Well, if we're imposing emissions targets across the board, as Mustafa's previous example supposes, such that if you had previously emitted 1 MT but would now be limited to 0.9 MT, we end up with a higher societal cost of abatement because we're making some high abatement cost emitters abate beyond the point of marginal damage equalling marginal abatement cost, and we're making some low-abatement-cost emitters abate too little. And to make it even worse, the more fine-grained we get --- "this unit at this power plant can now only emit 0.9 MT" v. "this power plant as a whole can only emit 4.5 MT" --- the less efficient we're likely to be!

So, what's the way out of this? Next time, I'll explain why a tax isn't much better than simply imposing limits by fiat, and why there's a better alternative.

There are three implications of this:

1. Absolute emissions rise if production increases roughly more than the increase in intensity of pollution, and only if production increase roughly more than the intensity of pollution. For the widget maker above, after a 10% reduction in intensity of GHG, it would need to raise production by over 11.1% to get back to its previous levels of emissions. If production rose by 11.1% or less, there would still be an absolute reduction in emissions.

   In the Conservative plan, there is an 18% reduction in intensity scheduled for 2010. That means that for there to be an absolute increase in emissions, production must rise by about 22% by 2010. This is not going to happen. That kind of growth in production is unheard of in an industry-wide basis, and because firms are going to be busy investing their money to become green, and won't have money to invest in expansion. There will almost certainly be an absolute reduction by 2010.

   It is less clear if absolute reductions will continue beyond that. The Conservative plan calls for 2% per year reductions going into the future. It's possible that there could be 2% increases in production each year to negate any additional absolute reductions beyond 2010. John Baird claims there will be a total of 20% in absolute reductions by 2020 from 2006. A big reduction in intensity in 2010 plus additional reductions upto 2020 amounting to a total of 40% in reduced intensity does make a 20% absolute reduction seem reasonable, with most of that being achieved in 2010.

   Let's put to rest the myth that the Conservative plan won't achieve any absolute reductions.

2. In the widget maker example, if there is an absolute cap on emissions, the widget maker would have to reduce emissions to 0.9 MT. It can achieve this in two ways: reducing production to 900 widgets, or making that 1,000 widgets produced more efficienty (of course a combination of the two is also possible). On the other hand, intensity-based reductions don't allow that second option: if you reduce production, you still have to make that reduced production more efficient.

   Put simply, intensity-based reductions force a firm to develop cleaner production. It also has no theoretical disincentive to produce. This ensures the development of cleaner technology, and limits harm to the economy. With an absolute reduction, in theory firms can be lazy, not use cleaner technolgy, and just produce less. This would result in no more cleaner technology, and harm to the economy (and the loss of consumer goods!).

   Of course, firms likely wouldn't just scale back production and forgoe possible profits. Likely under an absolute reduction scheme, firms will use a combination of reducted production and cleaner technology. But the extreme example above does illustrate that the incentives of absolute versus intensity-based reductions differ: absolute reductions will tend to harm the economy more and will result in less clean technology; intensity-based reductions will lead to much more innovation into clean technology. In particular, if you want Canada to compensate economic losses from reducing pollution through the emergence of a new green industry in Canada, intensity-based targets will do much better to foster such industry (I'm personally very skeptical that such a green industry would arise—I think it's mostly wishful thinking to make the case for emissions cuts seem easier.)

None of this is to say that absolute targets are necessarily bad, or that intensity-based targets are the way to go; absolute targets do have the benefit of resulting in a guaranteed reduction in emissions. My point is that intensity-based targets aren't necessarily a "complete and utter fraud". They can be if they are too small to result in any absolute reductions. The Conservative plan, at least up to 2010, does not call for very small reductions. Secondarily, I think there are good arguments for intensity-based targets over absolute targets. Using intensity-based targets does not mean that the government is tryign to mislead people

In any case, I don't think anyone realy cares that much about how we target reductions, so much as how much reduction we target, and how we plan to meet those reductions. The focus on the way the targets have been set is a side-show. In light of this, let's stop focusing on intensity-based targets. If you want larger reductions in emissions, fine; argue that the Conservative's targets are too low and need to be larger; don't argue that they are intensity-based and therefore must be bad.

A more useful argument, though, would be to point out that the fines in the Conservative plan and their measures for lightbulbs and energy-efficient appliances probably won't do much good. As well, the plan is *hoping* that innovation by other levels of government and the private sector will lead to additional reductions beyond what has been forcibly limited by regulations. There's a good chance that the Conservatives (and their successors?) may not meet the targets that they've set.

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