Steve’s alternate explanation is nonsensical. First, One doesn’t vote on what may be a government-defeating motion on purely strategic grounds. That is incredibly dangerous. No MP would do that. Steve outright admits this:

you and I both know (hell, Paul Martin himself probably knows, what with his extensive research staff and all) that the MP to whom I alluded above is fictitious, and that the 153 MPs who voted in favour of last night's motion did so because they wanted the government to fall.

If it is so obvious, why are you denying it in the same breath as admitting it?

Second, when over half of the House votes for an amendment to a motion, it indicates that over half of the House agrees with the content of that amendment. The only possible meaning of the content of that amendment is that the government should resign.

However, when over half of the House votes in favour of the Committee report as a whole, we cannot be sure as sure that the Committee agreed with the the recommendation that the government resign. It might have voted in favour of the report despite that recommendation because it believed so strongly in the other recommendations contained therein.

My point should be clear: the vote on the amendment was a clear indication of the House’s stance on the issue of whether the government should resign. There can be no other reason to vote for the amendment. The vote on the Committee report as a whole is a vote on a large set of recommendations, not just the recommendation that the government should resign. It is less clear that a vote on the report as a whole would be a no confidence motion.

Precedent dictates that amendments to a main motion are sufficient to express no confidence. In 1974, Trudeau’s government fell on a subamendment to the budget. Likewise, Joe Clark’s government in 1979. Neither of these two Prime Ministers argued that only a defeat on the full budget could constitute defeat; they accepted that an amendment and even a subamendment is enough.

Going one step further, by Steve’s logic, the defeat of a budget or a throne speech would only be defeats of those pieces of legislation; not indications of no confidence because they do not explicitly mention confidence. But clearly that is not the precedent on which parliamentary democracy in Canada works. Arthur Mieghen’s defeat in 1926 came on a mere motion that censured the government; it didn’t call on the government to resign. Yet it constituted a confidence motion nonetheless. Parliamentary democracy does, in part, depend on honorable conduct by elected officials and accepting clear indications of no confidence is part of that. As Steve has admitted, this was such a motion.

Steve’s next argument isn’t a substantive argument at all:

(incidentally, on this point I stand in agreement with a large majority of genuine constitutional scholars).

I’d like to see the evidence of a large majority agreeing with Steve’s position, noting that a few names doesn’t constitute the majority of Canadian constitutional scholars, let alone a large majority. I can parade out scholars too: Andrew Heard of Simon Fraser University and this scholarly review (Andrew Coyne affirms his credentials).

Andrew Heard’s analysis is particularly interesting, the conclusion (read the full article to see the build up to it) being thus:

It should not matter what procedural context a vote of confidence occurs in. The fundamental basis of a confidence vote is that the elected members of the legislature express their collective view of the government.  If that view conveys a loss of confidence or states that the government should resign, then the government must either resign or call an election.

… the current motion appears to be clearly a vote of confidence which would require the government to resign or call an election in the event it loses the vote.

Steve’s final argument is also weak:

However, if last night's vote showed us anything, it's that the House of Commons - by the slimmest of majorities - actually retains confidence in the government, since it's now clear that all three independents are with the government on this point (132 Liberals + 19 New Democrats + 3 Independents = 154 > half of the House's present membership).

First, I have no idea why Steve thinks all three independents are with the government. If they were, would not the government have won the vote? Three members of the House were missing for the vote: Irwin Cottler, John Efford, and Chuck Cadman. Cadman, one of the three independents, was not present so we do not know whether or not he supports the government.

But second, Steve is asserting that absent members should not be considered as abstentions. If so, what if the government lost on an explicit motion of no confidence but some members were absent? Is this enough to discredit that motion? What if some members are away for a budget vote that passes? Can the Opposition claim that the budget vote was not legitimate because some members were absent. Parliament does not recognize absent members; they are considered as abstentions. Those who show up to vote count; the rest do not. The vote of Parliament is then final save a motion to reconsider or a motion that retracts the previous decision. If the Liberals feel they still have the confidence of the House, they should table a motion asking for affirmation of that and show that they do. Claiming so isn’t good enough when the Opposition has shown the opposite.

The vote by the House indicated that the House thinks the government should resign. Period. No other explanation is realistic. The vote on the amendment was as clear a vote on that issue as there will be. Precedent stand with it being a confidence motion. And Steve has conceded this point anyway.

Beyond the analyses of the wording and context of the amendment, there are three other reasons this should be considered a confidence motion.

1. The Government should not determine the timing of a confidence motion. That is clearly ridiculous. The government could just stave off defeat by preventing confidence motions from being introduced. Which is exactly what Paul Martin has been doing by canceling Opposition days and filibustering his own budget. This amendment is the only way left for the Opposition to force a confidence vote on its own timetable. And for that reason it must be construed as a confidence vote.
2. The government has prevented all other means of introducing a confidence vote. Disregarding all the issues of timing, if Opposition days keep getting pushed back and no supply bills are being sent for voting, the Opposition has no other way of testing the confidence of the government.
3. Precedent. In 1926, the Conservatives directed a committee investigating scandal in the Department of Customs and Excise to amended its report of to include a censure of the government. A directive to a committee investigating scandal to amend its report, is exactly what we are dealing with today. However, unlike the 2005 motion which explicitly called for a recommendation that the government resign, the 1926 motion merely called for a statement that the Liberal government had been somewhat involved in the scandal. There was no call for resignation. Yet, Prime Minister King accepted that this would constitute a confidence vote in him. He tried to amend the amendment to remove the censure and was defeated. King accepted that defeat on the subamendment was a no confidence vote and resigned after failing to dissolve Parliament. The parallels are clear. King’s situation was much more ambiguous (no mention of resigning and a subamendment) and yet it constituted a no confidence motion. Surely, the motion on Tuesday constituted no confidence as well then.

Even if one wishes to cling to the claim that Tuesday’s motion was not a confidence motion, it was at the very least ambiguous. And every scholar I’ve read (Andrew Heard of Simon Fraser University, Professor Charles Frank of Queens’ University, Patrick Monahan, dean of Osgoode Hall law school, etc.) agrees that in the case of ambiguity over a confidence motion, as this one may be, the government must immediately table and put to a vote a clear motion that affirms the House’s confidence in it. That is the next day or two; not nine days later. The “government” (I no longer recognize them as such) will not even accept this final principle of parliamentary democracy.

It seems clear from precedent, from analysis of the context and wording of Tuesday’s motion, and from Steve’s own admission that Tuesday’s vote was a vote of no confidence. At the very least, it is a slightly ambiguous indication of no confidence and the “government” should table and put to a vote a motion that clarifies whether or not it was a confidence motion. Either way, the Liberals are playing fast and loose with the principles of responsible government and parliamentary democracy by neither recognizing Tuesday’s vote as a confidence vote, nor seeking to show that it as not through a second vote. The Liberals have torn one of the last constitutional conventions that is left. In doing so, they have decided that any rule, no matter how sacred, can be broken in order to keep power. That is the very antithesis of a democratic state.