The Corporate Manslaughter Bill proposes to change all this. Under the changes an organization can be held criminally responsible if senior managers act in ways that (a) cause a person's death, and (b) was a gross breach of "duty of care".

Proponents claim that this legislation can make corporations more accountable under the law and provide an effective deterrent. They also say that there's a public perception that the leaders of corporations be made personally liable for the organization's failings. Critics claim that this law can't be really effective unless it targets the activities of individuals. Justice Canada has been assessing the nature of corporate liability, and has also encountered some issues on the nature of associating corporations with humans who commit crimes.

But, what does this mean for the role of corporations in society? In a discussion piece, "Do Corporations Have Any Responsibility Beyond Making a Profit?" Norman Barry claims:

Frequently, companies are presented as collective entities that have the same moral duties as individual persons. But this is a risky strategy because, if morality is collectivized, then individual responsibility is diminished and persons are not assigned the blame (or awarded credit) for whatever action takes place within the company.

Individual and corporate moral agency need not be conceived as an "either/or." Both are responsible, insofar as either or both of them act, individually and collectively. The legal reasoning that Professor Barry cites does not count decisively against the notion of corporate moral responsibility, for corporations are routinely held accountable, and subject to fines, reparations, and other sanctions, for misdeeds performed on their behalf.

The debate continues. It's fascinating to see companies from Shell Canada to Nortel Networks to Coca-Cola talking about how their "organizations" are responsible for changing the social fabric of the world. Even if that's true, is that the result of their collective management, or is that just the result of groups of individuals? Likewise, is corporate manslaughter the result of individuals, or of some unknown "senior management"?

• Political interference on behalf of friends. From the Dupuy Affair where the CRTC was influenced into giving a radio license, to Art Eggelton’s giving his former girlfriend contracts for minimal return of service, the Liberals seem to interfere for personal gain far too often and usually stonewall when caught.
• The Krever Inquiry. This investigation into Hep-C tainting of blood was originally seen by the Liberals as a way to damage the Progressive Conservatives. Unfortunately, Krever found that responsibility went farther back than the Mulroney government, back to the final Trudeau Ministry. The Inquiry was shut down, and Hep-C victims who were infected prior to 1986 (an arbitrary date that puts all the blame on the PC government of Mulroney) have still not been compensated.
• The Somalia Inquiry. Boxes of documents were shredded to cover-up wrong doing. When it started to dig up dirt on the Liberals, it was quickly put to silence.
• The APEC Inquiry. PMO directed abuse of protesters was first ignored and then covered-up by the Liberals. Solicitor-General Andy Scott was overheard on an airplane explaining how he’d make the RCMP take the fall. Two inquiry chairs resigned on the grounds that there was political interference that prevented proper investigation. In the end, the report’s recommendations were ignored and the Liberals never took responsibility for their abuse of Canadian students.
• Gun Registry. A $13 million program has costed over $2 billion instead. Evidence and claims of mismanagement have never been been followed-up.
• HRDC Billion Dollar Boondoggle. A billion dollars in “Grants and Contracts” was lost, especially in the Transitional Jobs Fund, and never fully investigated. Evidence runs rampant of violations of financial administration rules, interference by Minister Pierre Pettigrew himself (who now Minister of Foreign Affairs) and of money flowing disproportionately to the riding of Saint-Maurice—the riding of Jean Chretien.
• Shawinigate. Where do I begin! Political interference by Jean Chretien, himself, in three government programs (the Immigrant Investors Program, the Business Development Bank, and the Transitional Jobs Fund) all of which had money flow to projects from which Chretien, himself, personally benefited. Tied into all this was a CIDA grant that should not have qualified for consideration, something allowed by Pierre Pettigrew, once again. In all this we have a quarter million dollar sale written on the back of a napkin that is of questionable authenticity (as determined by handwriting analysis). And a Chretien-appointed judge ordered an RCMP raid that destroyed evidence of all this. It was ordered on a Saturday without allowing the other side to present their case.
• AdScam. Tens of millions lost in sponsorship grants. Accusations of intimidation, death threats, laundering of cash, and links to organized crime.

Quotes from The Record article:
(Full text is available by signing up on The Record Site...or by emailing me)

-- Cadman said his riding constituents indicated in a poll that they don't want an election -- and said he must listen to them. "(It) is a major factor because I have to represent the views of my constituents.''

He said the poll of 600 eligible voters in his Surrey North riding, taken May 15 to 16, indicated two-thirds of respondents didn't want an election. He specified that 53 per cent of respondents didn't want an election this spring, 13 per cent didn't want one in the foreseeable future, and only 23 per cent wanted one immediately. The poll is considered accurate to within plus or minus four percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

-- Toronto-area Independent Carolyn Parrish has already said she will vote with the Liberals, her former party. But she was also upset about Stronach's instant promotion.

"It disgusts me. Absolutely. I can't believe how low we as Liberals will go to hang onto this government,'' she said.

Nevertheless, she said she'll vote with the government because a poll of 9,000 constituents in her riding suggested an overwhelming 72 per cent didn't want an election now.

The House ends Question Period, and resumes routine proceedings, with a discussion of National Parks Policy.

So, anyway, 5:45 pm arrives, and we vote!

Bill C-43 (the first 2005 budget) sails through the house, with everyone except the Bloc voting for the Bill.

Bill C-48 (the NDP-ish amendments) comes to the vote.

The Liberals vote for the bill. So do the NDP. So does Parrish.

But that's it! The Tories and the Bloc vote against. Kilgour votes against. And so does Mr. Cadman. Bill C-48 fails, and Mr. Martin announces that he'll ask Adrienne to dissolve Parliament on Friday.

The media swarm Mr. Cadman after the vote. He pauses, and then starts to rant.

"Do you really think that the events of the last 8 weeks have been productive for Canadian government? Sure, Surrey-North would rather not have an election, but they want some sort of government that functioned, and that had some sort of principles.

"We all know that the Liberals didn't do anything to help this -- getting people to cross the floor? Secret deals with the NDP? And don't get me started about the Tories -- secret audio-recordings and arcane parliamentary procedure, my ass!

"You see, Jim Harris of the Green Party contacted me this morning, and we had a brief chat. Do Canadians really like either the Liberals or the Conservatives? Why not have an alternative?

"That's why I'll be running for the nomination for the Green Party in Surrey-North. I urge Canadians with fiscal conservatism and environmental awareness to consider a mass change in all parties in government."

The media eats this up. As Adrienne drops the writ, Green Party polling numbers skyrocket. Credible candidates start appearing for the party.

The election is spun to an "Anybody but Martin or Harper" election, and the Bloc/NDP/Greens are all over the Liberals and Tories. Liberal numbers plummet. So do the Tories', but their core Western constituencies look safe. Both Martin and Harper fluster in speeches and debates, while English-Canadians are warming to Jim Harris (compared to Mr. Layton). Perhaps Jack's mustache has something to do with it?

After a bitter campaign, the Tories manage to retain 90-ish seats. The Greens get 60! The Liberals/Bloc/NDP's get 50/50/50 apiece. (Remember, this is some crazy dream.)

Governor General Adrienne says, "Screw it," and asks the incumbent (Martin) and the party with the most seats (Harper) to try to form a majority, and don't come back to her until they can find one.

Harper tries to negotiate a coalition with the Bloc and the Greens, and then the NDP and the Greens, but ideological differences prevent this. Eventually, Jim Harris and Martin come up with a suitable coalition with the NDP. "The Green, New, Liberal-Democratic Party of Canada" (known by the catchy abbreviation, "TGNLDPOC"), revives Paul Martin as Finance Minister, and Green Party members taking every other position in Cabinet.

As part of the coalition deal, the 22nd Prime Minister of Canada is... The Right Honourable Jack Layton.

What an awesome dream.

Though, I should probably stop eating burritos at 2 o'clock in the morning.

119. (1) Every one who

(a) being the holder of a judicial office, or being a member of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, corruptly

(i) accepts or obtains,

(ii) agrees to accept, or

(iii) attempts to obtain,

any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or another person in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity, or

(b) gives or offers, corruptly, to a person mentioned in paragraph (a) any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity for himself or another person,

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

Section 124 is also interesting,

124. Every one who

(a) purports to sell or agrees to sell an appointment to or a resignation from an office, or a consent to any such appointment or resignation, or receives or agrees to receive a reward or profit from the purported sale thereof, or

(b) purports to purchase or gives a reward or profit for the purported purchase of any such appointment, resignation or consent, or agrees or promises to do so,

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

As for corrupt little backwater, in overall terms, even among well-developed nations, Canada's amount of patronage and corruption is hardly shocking. I live in the US and when I explain the scandal to my friends here, they all say, "a paltry 100M? You guys are going to dissolve your government for THAT? Are you joking?" And this is true more or less of almost large administration, public or private.

That doesn't mean it's OK, of course. As I've said before, you won't find little ol' me voting Liberal. But behind-the-scenes corruption is not the only kind of corruption: public, open fleecing happens all the time. "Public Private Partnerships", for example--another Holy Roman Empire for you. Enronification another. The looting of the treasury goes ever on, and you have two responsibilities: to decide which looting is worse, and to decide what is the appropriate measure against it. Peter, and by extension the majority of the corruption-screamers (including many Bloc supporters) have to explain why their criteria are better than a large segment of the Canadian population.

When we see true "dictatorship," as opposed to yet another permutation of Parliamentary fiascos, we will see it in the eyes of the hysterical, not from their mouths. Until then, I will be interested in improving politics as I always am, no more, no less. Enough with this opportunism.

Canadians ought to realize that this week's breakdown of their Parliament is far more serious than any of the thuggish revelations from the Gomery commission. As of this weekend, we are in the historically unprecedented situation of having a Prime Minister who is clinging to office by recklessly disregarding the fundamental principles of our democracy. It is a shocking act of proto-tyranny, which justifies the extreme resort of intervention by the Governor-General.

I am not writing this lightly or with any knowledge of or involvement in any party's strategy. Nor do I think that most Canadians understand or perhaps even care about the complexities of the constitutional imbroglio that has unfolded since the opposition began defeating the government in the Commons last Wednesday. Canada this weekend has a government clinging to office against the repeatedly expressed wishes of a majority of the democratically elected members of the House of Commons.

In some countries at some times in their history, a situation like this would lead to citizens taking to the streets in protest. Instead, even those Canadians who notice the situation are content with the thought that it will probably only last until Thursday. Surely a few days of unconstitutionality can't matter.

But they do matter immensely, both for their immediate implications, and as precedent. The defeat of the Martin government on Tuesday came on a procedural, not a confidence motion, but it was such a clear sign that a majority of the House of Commons do not support the government that virtually all constitutional experts are agreed that an immediate test of the House's confidence was required.

Instead of doing this, the government proposed a nine-day delay, offering reasons for the delay so transparently bogus as to affront the intelligence of a 10-year-old. The British Columbia election has nothing whatever to do with the affairs of the Parliament of Canada. The visit of the Queen, a constitutional monarch whose activities are absolutely ceremonial and apolitical, cannot possibly in the 21st century take precedence over the need to resolve an impasse in our elected Parliament.

Paul Martin had a constitutional and moral responsibility to ascertain the confidence of the House of Commons on Wednesday. When he failed in this responsibility he was thumbing his nose at the conventions of responsible government and modern democracy. His government continued to disregard their constitutional responsibilities on Thursday and yesterday, leaving a frustrated opposition to demonstrate its lack of confidence repeatedly by taking control of parliamentary affairs in one vote after another. A government that has been shown to be unable to govern has stated that it will continue to stand in contempt of Parliament for the first three days of next week, but will finally face an explicit test of confidence on Thursday.

The problem with this strategy is that the unconstitutional delay in scheduling the vote of confidence saps it of its legitimacy. If the ministry, which is also manipulating all the levers of power every day it clings to office, wins the vote on Thursday the opposition will have every right to cry foul and continue to contest the government's legitimacy. It will almost certainly paralyze Parliament. At the very least the government's strategy is creating parliamentary bitterness and distrust such as we have never seen in the modern history of Canada. At worst, we are creating the kinds of precedents involving the erosion of our Constitution that in other countries have been initial steps on the road to dictatorship...

1. Lacking confidence of the House does not matter. Only a no confidence motion matters.

   Steve has asserted this in two ways:

   1. Procedure. Until a report has been accepted by the House, the House has not agreed to the contents therein, so the amendment that called on the government to resign does not matter because the House has not yet accepted that motion.
   2. Text. That motions can mean only what their text contains. [A] motion does not mean one thing when passed under one set of circumstances and another when passed under another. And it is not reasonable, from reading the motion, to interpret that motion as an expression of non-confidence in the government.

   To Steve, these two conditions are enough to mean that Tuesday’s vote should not be considered a vote of confidence.

   While I cannot dispute the technicality of this being a procedural motion, I do take exception that the text of the motion did not indicate a desire for the government to resign; what else can it indicate?

   But leaving all of these aside, let us discuss Steve’s basic contention of the primacy of confidence motions over actual confidence.

   The role of confidence in Westminister-style parliamentary democracy is to ensure that the Executive branch is acting in ways acceptable to the Legislative branch. This ensures that Executive authority cannot be abused, and it ensures that the government cannot come to a standstill because of disagreements between the Legislature and the Executive (e.g. gridlock as happens in the United States). It is clear that the aim of responsible government is to (a) ensure government accountability, and (b) ensure the continued operation of government. As long as confidence in the Executive persists, a government is accountable and functioning.

   If you argue that confidence doesn’t matter and that only confidence votes do, effectively you are arguing that it does not matter if or how egregiously the executive abuses and oversteps its authority, and that it does not matter if Parliament sinks into gridlock; all that matters is the explicit vote of the House of Commons. That means that the executive can act in an unaccountable fashion and in direct opposition to Parliament as long a the executive can prevent a vote on confidence from taking place. Proroguing parliament, not calling parliament into session, or, in the case of Paul Martin, preventing confidence motions from reaching the floor of Parliament, are all ways that a government could “hide” that it has lost the confidence of Parliament. Expressing no confidence in other ways would be unacceptable to those who argue for the primacy of confidence motions. Basically, if actual confidence does not matter and only confidence motions matter, then the executive can abuse its authority to prevent a confidence vote and thus acquire a license to continue to act in an unaccountable manner. Of course, the check on this kind of behaviour in responsible government is a no confidence motion. Which is exactly what the executive is preventing. See the problem here?

   Preventing confidence from being expressed is not how responsible government is supposed to work. And as I’ve argued previously, when responsible government fails in Canada, we have no democratic recourse to hold government to account. For this reason, responsible government must be upheld with primacy, and that means that confidence must take precedence over the way in which confidence is expressed. Ideally it will be expressed in an explicit motion by Parliament. But if that is not possible, another type of motion of Parliament must do, and failing that, some kind of extra-parliamentary expression. It is because an expression of no confidence must always be possible that the vote on Tuesday must be considered as a confidence vote.

   One could argue that this is adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of the law, however there is no “letter” of the law in this case. Nowhere is it set out that an executive must maintain the confidence of the House. In fact, the existence of virtually ever practice of parliamentary democracy and responsible government is not laid out in law. Absolute adherence to the letter of the law is incompatible with the evaluation of the operation of Canadian parliamentary democracy. Almost everything is a convention and not a law. Confidence votes are a convention for ensuring accountable and operable government. If we are to stick to the rigid adherence to the letter of the law that Steve desires, then we cease to have any checks on our executive beyond the Governor-General who is hardly a non-partisan having been effectively selected by the person she must keep in check. The spirit of responsible government must reign supreme in evaluating its application.

   Steve’s argument that since we do no know what Chuck Cadman’s vote would have been, we cannot be sure of the government’s lack of confidence is an argument that does not hold water. What if he never shows up? Does that mean that the House can never express no confidence? That’s clearly unacceptable in parliamentary democracy. That Cadman’s opinion is not known does not allow the government to count him in the “has confidence” column no more than it allows the opposition to count him in the “no confidence” column. That member has to be ignored. At the very least since 153 members thought it was a confidence vote, it should require an immediate vote of clarification in the government’s confidence. Arguing, as Steve does, that a clear and explicit vote of no confidence is necessary for there to be no confidence in the Executive is a dangerous standard. Such a standard effectively means that when Parliament is not in session or when the Executive chooses to avoid being held to account, the Executive does in fact become beyond reproach. It means that if the Executive ceases to be able to work with Parliament (as has been made clear for four days in a row now), unworkable government can persist. And it means that the Executive’s authority can trump that of Parliament. All of these are fundamental violations of the basic tenants of parliamentary democracy and responsible government.

2. A no confidence motion does not matter absolutely. Lacking the confidence of the House matters enough.

   Steve writes,

   [T]he government would be morally obligated to resign if it was clear that a majority of the House lacked confidence in the government.

   and

   the government would, in my view, be morally obligated to resign even absent a defeat on a non-confidence vote if it was clear that a majority of MPs supported the government’s resignation.

   Of course, it should be plainly obvious that this position blatantly contradicts Steve’s earlier points about procedural and textual technicalities being enough to make Tuesday’s motion not one of confidence. I see no need to comment further.

3. The government can legitimately deny a confidence motion from coming forward.

   Steve basically argues that it is fine for the Executive to decide when they will face a confidence vote as is the case with any other sort of vote. However, a confidence vote cannot be treated as any other vote. A confidence vote is the “failsafe” mechanism in parliamentary democracy. When the Executive is out of line and cannot be controlled by any other means, the one resort left to the people is for parliament to remove the Executive via a confidence vote. If an Executive will not put another item of business to a vote, it is out of line. The solution is to express no confidence in it. If an Executive won’t allow a no confidence vote, then the Executive has put itself beyond scrutiny.

   The problem our current Parliament has found itself in is that the opposition cannot put forward a confidence vote because it can put forward items of business only on opposition days. The Executive has refused to allow opposition days. The opposition cannot schedule its own opposition days because it cannot make such a motion except on opposition days! When it tried to put forward such a motion at the end of April, the opposition day was cancelled. The House of Commons also has not been presented by a no confidence vote by the Executive. So the House has had to express no confidence via motions that aren’t stand-alone motions: an amendment to a committee report calling on the government to resign, and the adjournment of the House three days in a row. It has used these motions because these are the only means of expression within Parliament still at its disposal.

   Steve wishes to transfer onus onto the opposition to express no confidence from the government to express confidence. This is dangerous. Effectively it means that the Executive can effect all kinds of destructive decisions while it prevents being held accountable. This state of affairs can only be acceptable if the Legislature begins by expressing confidence in the Executive to give it an initial legitimacy, and the Legislature reserves the right to withdraw that confidence at the time of its choosing. And without question, when confidence is ambiguous, government should fall into a steady-state and let the status quo persist until the government can affirm its confidence. Otherwise, the country could fall prey to destructive action. At present, if the Legislature is to retain the ability to express no confidence, it must do so by motions that aren’t stand-alone motion of no confidence. At the very least, passage of Tuesday’s motion, if not an outright expression of no confidence, was the only way for the opposition to express no confidence at the time. It was thus a motion of no confidence. At the very minimum it made the state of confidence in the government ambiguous (though it is hard to argue a motion calling for resignation of the Executive was ambiguous). The onus thus currently resides on the Executive to prove it has the confidence of the House.

   It is grossly inconsistent with the principles of responsible government for the opposition to lack a way to express no confidence in the Executive. By arguing that the Executive should be seen to have the ability to set the time and date of confidence votes, Steve is arguing is that this basic principle of responsible government be removed. Effectively, Steve is arguing that Canada should not operation on the principles of responsible government. Unless he is really arguing we move to some other system (e.g. a system of separation of powers), Steve’s position is unacceptable.

The Honourable Member’s first point, in response to my contention that the motion was not technically a confidence vote because it is possible to conceive circumstances under which an MP who had confidence in the government would nevertheless vote in favour of it, was as follows:

Steve’s alternate explanation is nonsensical. First, one doesn’t vote on what may be a government-defeating motion on purely strategic grounds.

If one does not, Mr. Speaker, I am quite at a loss to explain exactly what the Conservative and Bloc Québécois caucuses are presently doing, as it appears obvious to any observer that voting on what may be government-defeating motions on purely strategic grounds is what has consumed much of their time lately. Apart from that, though, I do not think it at all outlandish that an MP who did not wish to see Parliament dissolved would nevertheless support the holding of a non-confidence vote in order to clear the air, which is exactly what passing the motion passed on Tuesday will, eventually, lead to – even if the government does not restore the opposition days that it has so contemptibly removed.

The Honourable Member then accuses me of having admitted his allegation myself when I said

you and I both know (hell, Paul Martin himself probably knows, what with his extensive research staff and all) that the MP to whom I alluded above is fictitious, and that the 153 MPs who voted in favour of last night's motion did so because they wanted the government to fall.

Mr. Speaker, as ought to be clear to anybody who read my initial comments, I certainly did not express any agreement at all with his contention that it would be “nonsensical” for an MP to vote for the amendment voted on last night – I merely said that in this instance, it appeared obvious that no MP had done so. This distinction is important because the text of a motion must stand on its own – a motion does not mean one thing when passed under one set of circumstances and another when passed under another. And it is not reasonable, from reading the motion, to interpret that motion as an expression of non-confidence in the government. That it appears that those who voted in favour of it do not have confidence in the government does not and cannot change the motion from being a merely procedural one to being one of non-confidence. The Honourable Member’s subsequent “points” about how a motion of non-confidence need not include the word “confidence” and about how an amendment may be considered a motion of non-confidence are correct, if entirely irrelevant.

In the midst of these self-evidence ramblings, however, he did make one largely fallacious paragraph:

The vote on the amendment was a clear indication of the House’s stance on the issue of whether the government should resign. There can be no other reason to vote for the amendment. The vote on the Committee report as a whole is a vote on a large set of recommendations, not just the recommendation that the government should resign.

Surely if a main motion could be supported despite elements of it being disagreeable, an amendment could be supported on the same basis?

But this is irrelevant, as I have already offered my full agreement that the MPs who voted in favour of the amendment do not have confidence in the government – what I hope I have established above is that, despite this being the case, the amendment in question was not a non-confidence motion.

The Honourable Member pressed on, however:

Steve is asserting that absent members should not be considered as abstentions. If so, what if the government lost on an explicit motion of no confidence but some members were absent? Is this enough to discredit that motion? What if some members are away for a budget vote that passes? Can the Opposition claim that the budget vote was not legitimate because some members were absent. Parliament does not recognize absent members; they are considered as abstentions. Those who show up to vote count; the rest do not. The vote of Parliament is then final save a motion to reconsider or a motion that retracts the previous decision.

Again, what the Member says is quite correct, but equally irrelevant: I was not asserting that the government didn’t really lose Tuesday’s vote (it did) but rather that, given that the vote was not a non-confidence vote (see above) the vote didn’t matter. Even though the vote didn’t matter, however, I argued that the government would be morally obligated to resign if it was clear that a majority of the House lacked confidence in the government. In this case, I was not talking about the majority of the House present for a given vote, because there has been no vote on the question of confidence in the government. Instead, I was talking about a majority of the House’s 307 members. While I misspoke when I asserted that it was clear that the government retains the confidence of a majority of the House (I’d taken the negative vote of the Honourable Member for Edmonton-Beaumont on the amendment as an indicator of his confidence in the government, which was apparently a mistake – though it’s telling that, in defiance of the Honourable Member for M. Mustafa Hirji’s earlier assertion that all MPs were treating this as a motion of non-confidence – and I’d misunderstood some earlier comments on the part of the Honourable Member for Surrey North as indicating that he would vote to uphold the government, when he in fact, apparently, remains undecided), the fact remains that it’s certainly not clear that a majority of the fully constituted House of Commons has lost confidence in government, so the government is not obligated to resign on that basis.

Let me reiterate my position on this, so there can be no doubt: There are, in my view, two relevant circumstances under which the government would be obligated to resign. First, if the government is defeated on a confidence motion which, as I’ve established above (and will establish somewhat further below) has not happened. Second, the government would, in my view, be morally obligated to resign even absent a defeat on a non-confidence vote if it was clear that a majority of MPs supported the government’s resignation. That does not appear to be the case, based on the outcome of Tuesday’s vote.

The Honourable Member closed his case with a list of three alleged reasons that Tuesday’s vote was clearly one of non-confidence. I shall refute them in the order in which they were presented.

The Government should not determine the timing of a confidence motion.

The Honourable Member will get no disagreement from me on this point – I think it’s shameful the extent to which the House of Commons allows its agenda to be dictated by the government, frankly. But the fact that the House of Commons has created this extremely government-centric set of rules does not give the opposition the privilege of decreeing any motion it likes to be a motion of non-confidence.

The government has prevented all other means of introducing a confidence vote.

Again, this is a despicably abuse of Parliament by the government. But again, it doesn’t necessarily follow that any motion the opposition wants to be a motion of non-confidence suddenly becomes one.

Precedent.

The difference in 1926 was that the Prime Minister had declared the motion to be a confidence vote in advance of its occurrence – he had said that his government would resign if the House passed the motion. It is not at all clear that the amendment to the committee report in question would have constituted a non-confidence motion if Prime Minister King hadn’t declared it to be one (Pierre Trudeau threatened to employ the same tactic during the period from 1972 to 1974). For this reason, the present situation is not analogous to the 1926 situation.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that I do not come across in all this as a defender of the Martin government – no label could be less apt. However, I have not yet seen any evidence that it has lost either the moral or the legal authority to govern (it has obviously lost the practical *ability* to govern, and should seek an election for that reason – but that’s not what’s up for debate at this point). The Honourable Member for M. Mustafa Hirji would be well-served to forget his histrionics surrounding Canada’s alleged descent into a state of dictatorship (more so than usually, that is) and to focus instead on the broader questions of whether anything has happened since June 28 to justify a loss of confidence in this government.

Steve’s alternate explanation is nonsensical. First, One doesn’t vote on what may be a government-defeating motion on purely strategic grounds. That is incredibly dangerous. No MP would do that. Steve outright admits this:

you and I both know (hell, Paul Martin himself probably knows, what with his extensive research staff and all) that the MP to whom I alluded above is fictitious, and that the 153 MPs who voted in favour of last night's motion did so because they wanted the government to fall.

If it is so obvious, why are you denying it in the same breath as admitting it?

Second, when over half of the House votes for an amendment to a motion, it indicates that over half of the House agrees with the content of that amendment. The only possible meaning of the content of that amendment is that the government should resign.

However, when over half of the House votes in favour of the Committee report as a whole, we cannot be sure as sure that the Committee agreed with the the recommendation that the government resign. It might have voted in favour of the report despite that recommendation because it believed so strongly in the other recommendations contained therein.

My point should be clear: the vote on the amendment was a clear indication of the House’s stance on the issue of whether the government should resign. There can be no other reason to vote for the amendment. The vote on the Committee report as a whole is a vote on a large set of recommendations, not just the recommendation that the government should resign. It is less clear that a vote on the report as a whole would be a no confidence motion.

Precedent dictates that amendments to a main motion are sufficient to express no confidence. In 1974, Trudeau’s government fell on a subamendment to the budget. Likewise, Joe Clark’s government in 1979. Neither of these two Prime Ministers argued that only a defeat on the full budget could constitute defeat; they accepted that an amendment and even a subamendment is enough.

Going one step further, by Steve’s logic, the defeat of a budget or a throne speech would only be defeats of those pieces of legislation; not indications of no confidence because they do not explicitly mention confidence. But clearly that is not the precedent on which parliamentary democracy in Canada works. Arthur Mieghen’s defeat in 1926 came on a mere motion that censured the government; it didn’t call on the government to resign. Yet it constituted a confidence motion nonetheless. Parliamentary democracy does, in part, depend on honorable conduct by elected officials and accepting clear indications of no confidence is part of that. As Steve has admitted, this was such a motion.

Steve’s next argument isn’t a substantive argument at all:

(incidentally, on this point I stand in agreement with a large majority of genuine constitutional scholars).

I’d like to see the evidence of a large majority agreeing with Steve’s position, noting that a few names doesn’t constitute the majority of Canadian constitutional scholars, let alone a large majority. I can parade out scholars too: Andrew Heard of Simon Fraser University and this scholarly review (Andrew Coyne affirms his credentials).

It should not matter what procedural context a vote of confidence occurs in. The fundamental basis of a confidence vote is that the elected members of the legislature express their collective view of the government.  If that view conveys a loss of confidence or states that the government should resign, then the government must either resign or call an election.

… the current motion appears to be clearly a vote of confidence which would require the government to resign or call an election in the event it loses the vote.

Steve’s final argument is also weak:

However, if last night's vote showed us anything, it's that the House of Commons - by the slimmest of majorities - actually retains confidence in the government, since it's now clear that all three independents are with the government on this point (132 Liberals + 19 New Democrats + 3 Independents = 154 > half of the House's present membership).

First, I have no idea why Steve thinks all three independents are with the government. If they were, would not the government have won the vote? Three members of the House were missing for the vote: Irwin Cottler, John Efford, and Chuck Cadman. Cadman, one of the three independents, was not present so we do not know whether or not he supports the government.

But second, Steve is asserting that absent members should not be considered as abstentions. If so, what if the government lost on an explicit motion of no confidence but some members were absent? Is this enough to discredit that motion? What if some members are away for a budget vote that passes? Can the Opposition claim that the budget vote was not legitimate because some members were absent. Parliament does not recognize absent members; they are considered as abstentions. Those who show up to vote count; the rest do not. The vote of Parliament is then final save a motion to reconsider or a motion that retracts the previous decision. If the Liberals feel they still have the confidence of the House, they should table a motion asking for affirmation of that and show that they do. Claiming so isn’t good enough when the Opposition has shown the opposite.

The vote by the House indicated that the House thinks the government should resign. Period. No other explanation is realistic. The vote on the amendment was as clear a vote on that issue as there will be. Precedent stand with it being a confidence motion. And Steve has conceded this point anyway.

Beyond the analyses of the wording and context of the amendment, there are three other reasons this should be considered a confidence motion.

1. The Government should not determine the timing of a confidence motion. That is clearly ridiculous. The government could just stave off defeat by preventing confidence motions from being introduced. Which is exactly what Paul Martin has been doing by canceling Opposition days and filibustering his own budget. This amendment is the only way left for the Opposition to force a confidence vote on its own timetable. And for that reason it must be construed as a confidence vote.
2. The government has prevented all other means of introducing a confidence vote. Disregarding all the issues of timing, if Opposition days keep getting pushed back and no supply bills are being sent for voting, the Opposition has no other way of testing the confidence of the government.
3. Precedent. In 1926, the Conservatives directed a committee investigating scandal in the Department of Customs and Excise to amended its report of to include a censure of the government. A directive to a committee investigating scandal to amend its report, is exactly what we are dealing with today. However, unlike the 2005 motion which explicitly called for a recommendation that the government resign, the 1926 motion merely called for a statement that the Liberal government had been somewhat involved in the scandal. There was no call for resignation. Yet, Prime Minister King accepted that this would constitute a confidence vote in him. He tried to amend the amendment to remove the censure and was defeated. King accepted that defeat on the subamendment was a no confidence vote and resigned after failing to dissolve Parliament. The parallels are clear. King’s situation was much more ambiguous (no mention of resigning and a subamendment) and yet it constituted a no confidence motion. Surely, the motion on Tuesday constituted no confidence as well then.

Even if one wishes to cling to the claim that Tuesday’s motion was not a confidence motion, it was at the very least ambiguous. And every scholar I’ve read (Andrew Heard of Simon Fraser University, Professor Charles Frank of Queens’ University, Patrick Monahan, dean of Osgoode Hall law school, etc.) agrees that in the case of ambiguity over a confidence motion, as this one may be, the government must immediately table and put to a vote a clear motion that affirms the House’s confidence in it. That is the next day or two; not nine days later. The “government” (I no longer recognize them as such) will not even accept this final principle of parliamentary democracy.

It seems clear from precedent, from analysis of the context and wording of Tuesday’s motion, and from Steve’s own admission that Tuesday’s vote was a vote of no confidence. At the very least, it is a slightly ambiguous indication of no confidence and the “government” should table and put to a vote a motion that clarifies whether or not it was a confidence motion. Either way, the Liberals are playing fast and loose with the principles of responsible government and parliamentary democracy by neither recognizing Tuesday’s vote as a confidence vote, nor seeking to show that it as not through a second vote. The Liberals have torn one of the last constitutional conventions that is left. In doing so, they have decided that any rule, no matter how sacred, can be broken in order to keep power. That is the very antithesis of a democratic state.

The Liberals can whine that this was not a confidence motion and is only procedural, and they might even find support in their newfound conspirators, the NDP (has Jack Layton commented on this yet?), but the House asking a committee to recommend the Executive resign is a clear indication that the House wants the Executive to resign. And that is a clear indication of no confidence. Moreso than a defeat on a budget or supply motion: those only show disagreement with certain policy decisions and don't indicate that the House wants the Executive to resign. A motion explicity stating no confidence might be more direct. But is there really any significant difference between we don't have confidence in you any more and we want you to resign? The former might more directly indicate no confidence, but the latter more directly indicates what you want done about the lack of confidence. On balance, I think everyone would agree the latter is the more harsh judgement.

Yet the government of Paul Martin disagrees. And worse, disagrees that there is any implication of no confidence. In doing so, Paul Martin and his government, possibly in concert with Jack Layton and the NDP, have eroded the only meaningful constraint on Executive power in Canada. An unbridled Executive is characteristic of dictatorships and single-party states; not parliamentary democracies.

Responsible government died today and it took democracy with it. This is not a trivial matter.